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U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (Feb. 3, 2022)1
NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXEMPTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
UNDER CITY OF FERNLEY
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court received certified questions from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals under Rule 5 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure. The questions that the Ninth
Circuit certified to the Nevada Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Nevada Supreme Court’s
holding in City of Fernley v. State, Department of Taxation2 exempts declaratory relief actions
from statutes of limitations; and if not, (2) which period of limitation would apply to a claim
brought by a lienholder seeking a declaratory judgment that the lien was not extinguished by a
subsequent foreclosure on the property, and (3) what triggers the running of the limitations
period for such a claim?
The Nevada Supreme Court held that its previous holding in City of Fernley did not
categorically exempt declaratory relief actions from statutes of limitations periods. Next, the
Court held that an action brought to determine the validity of a lien under NRS 40.010 was
subject to the four-year catch-all statute of limitations under NRS 11.220. Finally, the Court held
that a foreclosure sale does not necessarily trigger the four-year statute of limitations in such an
action but rather begins to run when the titleholder affirmatively repudiates the lien.
Background
The appellant, U.S. Bank, N.A., held a deed of trust on a residential real property. In
2011, the HOA foreclosed the due to unpaid HOA assessments, and the bank did not challenge
the foreclosure sale at the time. Subsequently, the property was transferred to the respondent,
Thunder Properties, Inc. In 2016, the bank filed suit seeking to quiet title on the property as well
as declaratory relief determining that the bank’s interest in the property was not extinguished by
the foreclosure sale. Respondent argued that the foreclosure sale triggered the running of the
statute of limitations and because of that, the bank’s suit was time-barred and should be
dismissed.
The federal district court dismissed the action as time-barred, and the Ninth Circuit
certified the above-referenced three questions to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Discussion
City of Fernley does not hold that declaratory relief actions are categorically exempt from
statutes of limitations
The court first discussed the issue of whether City of Fernley created a blanket rule
exempting claims for prospective relief exempt from statutes of limitations. The Court
highlighted the different application of limitations statutes between retrospective relief and
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prospective relief. The Court also stated that the constitutional supremacy doctrine precludes a
statute of limitations from barring challenge to an unconstitutional statutory provision because a
party has the right to protect themselves from future violations of their constitutional rights. In
doing so, the Court clarified that City of Fernley provides that the failure to file a claim within
the statute of limitations period does not bar all relief. However, City of Fernley did not create a
categorial exemption from statutes of limitation for declaratory relief.
Conversely, the Court stated that absent an ongoing violation of a party’s constitutional
rights, a declaratory relief action cannot circumvent the statute of limitations. Rather, if a legal
remedy would be time-barred under the same substantive claim as an action for declaratory
relief, such declaratory relief would also be time-barred. Thus, for the first certified question, the
Court held that actions for declaratory relief are not exempt from statutes of limitation when
there is not an ongoing violation of a party’s constitutional rights.
This is a quiet title action under NRS 40.010
Next, the Court considered which statute of limitations would apply to the case at hand.
The Court highlighted the fact that when determining which statute of limitations to apply to
declaratory relief, courts consider the substantive claim on which the relief is based. Both parties
agreed that respondent’s property title was not in dispute, but rather the parties disputed the
validity of the bank’s lien on that title. The Court determined that the bank sought to quiet title
and determine that its lien had not been extinguished. After considering and rejecting both
parties’ arguments asserting analogous limitations periods, the Court held that the NRS 11.220
four-year catch-all statute of limitations applied to the bank’s claim for declaratory relief.
The four-year catch-all statute of limitations applies
Finally, the Court considered what would trigger the running of the four-year statute of
limitations in such a case. A recent ruling in Berberich v. Bank of America, N.A.3 provided
clarification on this matter. In Berberich, a plaintiff bought property at a foreclosure sale and six
years later sought to quiet title in himself by way of judicial determination that the foreclosure
sale extinguished the lender’s original deed of trust. In Berberich, the Nevada Supreme Court
held mere notice of an adverse claim is not enough to trigger the running of the statute of
limitations. Rather, the statute of limitations begins to run when the property owner has notice of
disturbed possession. The Court noted that while Berberich was not controlling in this case, it
was highly instructive.
The four-year limitations period is not triggered until the titleholder repudiates the lien
In this case, the Court held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a
lienholder until it has something analogous to a notice of disturbed possession, such as a
repudiation of the lien. In this case, the foreclosure sale, by itself, was not sufficient to trigger the
running of the statute of limitations because a foreclosure sale may or may not extinguish a
bank’s deed of trust. The Court likened the disclosure sale to notice of an adverse claim rather
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than notice of disturbed possession and stated that affirmative action is required to rise to the
level that would trigger the limitations period.
Conclusion
The Court answered the Ninth Circuit’s certified questions as follows:
1) City of Fernley did not create a rule that categorically exempts declaratory relief from
being time-barred by statutes of limitation.
2) The four-year catch-all statute of limitations under NRS 11.220 applies to U.S. Bank,
N.A.’s claim for quiet title and declaratory relief.
3) Some type of affirmative action, such as repudiation of the lien, is required before the
four-year statute of limitations begins to run against a lienholder.
Concurrence and Partial Dissent
The partial dissent differed in opinion from the majority regarding what triggers the
running of the statute of limitations on a deed of trust holder’s claim for equitable relief on a
foreclosure sale. The dissent criticized the majority’s opinion as advisory and as presenting a
one-size-fits-all approach. The dissent argued that quiet title and declaratory judgment actions
can bring a variety of claims. Due to that, the dissent argued that the Court should have answered
the Ninth Circuit’s questions as related directly to the claims alleged in the bank’s complaint
rather than in the abstract.
First, regarding the bank’s claim that the foreclosure sale was unfair, and that equity
should invalidate it, the dissent agreed with the majority that the four-year statute of limitations
under NRS 11.220 applied because there was no analogous limitations statute that could be
applied.
However, the dissent argued that the majority’s holding of what triggers the statute of
limitations conflicts with equitable claims that seek to set aside HOA foreclosure sales. The
dissent stated that it would instead rule that the HOA foreclosure sale triggers the four-year
statute of limitations.
Next, the dissent addressed the bank’s second claim regarding tender futility. The dissent
argued that under this theory, the bank’s deed of trust survived the HOA foreclosure sale, and the
buyer took title to the property subject to the bank’s deed of trust. Because of this, the dissent
argued that the four-year statute of limitations did not apply to the bank’s tender/tender futility
claim but rather the deed of trust would remain enforceable until it expired under the applicable
statutes.
Finally, the dissent stated that City of Fernley involved different questions, and thus, it
would leave analysis of this question for a different time.
In refuting the dissent’s arguments, the majority stated that its opinion was not advisory,
but rather the question of whether a triggering action was present was beyond the scope of the
Court’s analysis. Next, the majority stated that its opinion did not provide a one-size-fits-all
approach, but rather that the majority focused on the substantive claims presented rather than the

labels of quiet title and declaratory relief in answering the question of whether the bank’s interest
persisted as a consequence of the HOA foreclosure sale.

